Introduction
Over the last few decades, most industrialized countries have increased access to legal abortions. As a result, some 40% of the world's population currently resides in countries that permit abortion on demand. Another 25% has access to abortion on socioeconomic and mental health grounds which are, in most cases, broadly interpreted (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2008) .
We examine the relationship between abortion access and sexual behavior for a sample of 41 North American, European, and Central Asian countries. This work extends previous studies by Klick and Stratmann The behavioral response can be formalized in a simple economic model. We assume that an individual's utility (U ) positively depends on the "consumption" of sex that includes both its frequency and riskiness (S), and a composite good (X ). We further assume that utility U (S, X ) is concave in S, i.e. that the marginal utility sex decreases in the level of its consumption. As we investigate the sexual behavior of heterosexual couples 1 , the cost of sex (C) among other things includes the risk of unwanted pregnancy that increases with every additional sexual encounter. In formal terms, the marginal cost of sex is positive. This framework generates a downward sloping demand curve for sexual activity. 2 Assume, for instance, that the cost (price) of sex drops through some intervention. Because Equation (1) implies the utility maximum is achieved when the marginal utility of sex equals its marginal cost, a rational individual will respond to this change by extending the consumption of sex until the equivalence between marginal cost and benefit is reestablished. Thus, the hypothesized decision rule mirrors the rational decision rule that individuals follow for standard economic activities:
The cost associated with unwanted pregnancy (which is a component of C) goes beyond the financial burden of giving birth and raising a child. For example, pregnancy and motherhood can diminish earnings through their negative impact on educational opportunities and labor market participation (Angrist and Evans, 1999) . Further, the opportunity to give up a child for adoption does not avoid the physical and financial cost of pregnancy and delivery, and can cause additional cost in the form of emotional hardship. Induced abortion can reduce the costs of pregnancy and avoid those of motherhood. However, the procedure's legal status is an important determinant of its cost; therefore, it is a component of the cost of risky sexual behavior. If access to legal and safe abortions is restricted, these costs increase as a result of higher search and pecuniary costs, an increase in health risks 3 , and the threat of criminal prosecution for both providers and seekers of illegal abortions. Consequently, our theoretical model predicts more and riskier sexual activities under more liberal abortion regimes. 4 This does not imply that every individual facing a more liberal abortion law will show riskier sexual behavior. For those who reject abortion regardless of its legal status, policy changes might be irrelevant. 5 However, for our prediction to hold, it suffices if at least some individuals adapt their sexual behavior to a change in abortion access.
Review of Abortion Laws
In the second half of the twentieth century, many countries have extended the circumstances under which abortions can legally be performed. 6 At the same time, there is a large variety of abortion legislation across countries.
De jure abortion legislation is typically grouped into five categories (see, for example, Rahman et al., 1998) . Starting with the most restrictive category, these are: abortion prohibited altogether or allowed only to save the woman's life; permitted to preserve her physical health; permitted to preserve her 3. The World Health Organization estimates that twenty million unsafe and illegal abortions are carried out every year, resulting in 78,000 maternal deaths and hundreds of thousands of disabilities. Today, since most developed countries have liberalized abortion-access, illegal abortion has primarily become a phenomenon of the developing world. See Cook and Dickens (1988) , Cook et al. (1999) , and Grimes et al. (2006) . 4. It is also possible to generate this prediction with a simple model of condom use. If we assume that individuals use condoms to prevent conception and contracting STDs but that condoms are costly, abortion availability lowers the contraceptive benefits of condoms without changing their STD prevention capacity. This implies that once abortion becomes more widely available, individuals will be less likely to use condoms. Consequently, a ceteris paribus increase in STD incidence is predicted.
5. However, even for those individuals, the cost of rejecting sexual intercourse increases when abortion becomes widely accessible (Akerlof et al., 1996) . These individuals may thus increase their sexual activities because of the higher cost of rejecting potential sexual partners and not because of the reduced risk of unplanned motherhood.
6. Investigating abortion policies worldwide, Dickens (1978, 1988) , Cook et al. (1999) , and Boland and Katzive (2008) identify 118 policy changes towards liberalization for . During the same period, more restrictive policies were implemented only 13 times.
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In our approach, we measure abortion access by grouping written abortion laws into three categories. 7 The first category incorporates the most restrictive legislation that permits abortion only when the woman's life or her physical health is at serious risk. These policies make it virtually impossible to obtain legal abortions on demand. The second category comprises laws that make abortion available for mental health and socioeconomic reasons. We use this generic category because the reading of mental health is in most cases rather liberal, so that mental health grounds often implicitly include socioeconomic reasons. 8 The third category covers all laws that permit abortion on demand.
We group the country periods in our sample group into the three categories as follows.
The first, most restrictive category that permits abortion only to preserve the pregnant woman's life or her physical health comprises Albania from 1980 until 1990 9 , Ireland during the entire 1980-2000 sample period, Portugal from 1980 to 1983 , and Spain from 1980 to 1985 7. The following categorization is based on the aforementioned five categories of the written abortion law. In addition to belonging to one of these categories, abortion laws also typically contain further provisions: Different third party authorization requirements involving physicians or committees of physicians, social workers, parents, or spouses in the abortion decision. Some laws make counseling and waiting periods mandatory. Financial support for the procedure also varies by country and by the reason for which abortion is obtained. While the cost of therapeutic abortions is commonly fully covered, abortions on demand often are paid for privately. Moreover, direct charges for abortions are not the only way in which income can affect abortion access. Additional costs typically accrue when health facilities that perform abortions are remote. This occurs not only in countries with few abortion facilities, but also if conscientious objection clauses are permitted and invoked by a large part of physician in an area, like in Southern Italy or Luxembourg. Also, in federal systems that regulate abortion at the state level, access can vary geographically.
8. Where not otherwise indicated, the following account draws from the United Nations 2002 International Review of Abortion Policies. See United Nations (2002).
9. Albania fully liberalized its abortion law to make abortion on demand available in April 1991. For law changes that occur until June 15th of a given year, we group this year into the post-reform category. Correspondingly, when abortion law reform takes place in the second half of a given year, the reform year falls into the pre-reform abortion law category and only the next year is grouped into the post-reform category.
10. Prior to the 1981 reform which fully liberalized abortion, Dutch legislation did not permit abortion unless the woman's life was at risk, although the law was not strictly 11. Poland is the only former socialist country that has continued to restrict abortion access. In fact, the democratically elected Polish governments have taken a tougher stance on abortion than their communist antecedents under whose rule abortion was legal in cases of unspecified "difficult living conditions." In 1993, all socioeconomic grounds were eliminated from the law, so that abortion remained legal only to preserve the woman's mental health. The socioeconomic grounds were briefly reinstated in 1997, but shortly after, a pro-life coalition regained the parliamentary majority and reestablished the more restrictive 1993 law.
12. In socialist Bulgaria, Hungary and, until 1986, Czechoslovakia, abortion was accessible on a number of socioeconomic grounds, including being unmarried. For married women, the socioeconomic criteria included a minimum number of existing children, age (typically 40 or over), a serious sickness of the husband, disintegration of the family, and difficult economic conditions 13. From the 1960s, in Romania, abortion was legal only for medical reasons and narrowly defined socioeconomic reasons. Abortion on socioeconomic grounds required abortion seeking women to already have five children under their care or to be older than 45 years of age.
14. The Western part of Germany operated under a law that allowed abortion on socioeconomic grounds since 1975. This legislation contrasted with that of the German Democratic Republic where abortion on demand was available. After unification, the separate legislations co-existed for almost three years until a Federal Constitutional Court ruling in 1993 made abortion on demand available in the entire country.
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) and Yugoslavian States (Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Macedonia) in our sample. It also includes Austria, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. For each country in our sample, Table 1 reports our coding of the abortion legislation, details of the law including its date of inception, and the periods for which gonorrhea incidence data are reported.
Empirical Strategy
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether a change in the cost of sexual activity leads to changes in sexual behavior. Given a lack of data on sexual activities (see, for instance, Fenton et al., 2001 and Hewett et al., 2008) , we exploit the fact that certain infectious diseases are primarily transmitted through sexual intercourse. We use the reported incidence of a prominent STD, gonorrhea, as a proxy for risky sexual activities. For a number of reasons, the reported gonorrhea rate is attractive as a proxy for the frequency of risky sexual activity. It is one of the most frequent STDs 15 , and time-series data are available for a large set of countries. Further, its latency period is short, minimizing the lag between infection and diagnosis and because it is easily cured, gonorrhea has simpler dynamics than other STDs Stratmann, 2003, 2008) . Finally, in contrast to syphilis, gonorrhea is not primarily transmitted among homosexual individuals.
16
15. In 1995, global incidence was only higher for Trichomoniasis and Chlamydia (Gerbase et al., 1998) .
16. For the United States, the share of gonorrhea cases that are contracted through homosexual intercourse is estimated to be 20%, while for syphilis, it is three times as large (Center for Disease Control, 2006 With an unbalanced panel of 41 countries and 21 years from 1980 to 2000, we estimate the following regression equation:
The independent variable GONRATE it is the number of newly diagnosed reported gonorrhea cases per 100,000 individuals per year t and country i.
ε it represents an idiosyncratic error term. We estimate these models with weighted least squares using a country's population as a weight.
17
To model the relationship between abortion access on the reported incidence of gonorrhea, our model includes two abortion law dummy variables. ondemand it equals 1 if country i permits abortion on demand in period t, and 0 otherwise. Correspondingly, socment it equals 1 if the current legislation permits abortion on socioeconomic or mental health grounds. The omitted reference category is laws that permit abortion only to save the pregnant woman's physical health or her life. In an alternative specification, we use an abortion law dummy that equals 1 if abortion is available on demand or on socioeconomic or mental health grounds and 0 if abortion is only legal to save the pregnant woman's life or her physical health. Since we use the most restrictive regimes that only permit abortion to save the woman's life or physical health as the implicit comparison group, our theory predicts positive abortion law coefficients β.
The vector X it contains control variables and γ is the corresponding vector of coefficients. The controls include two macroeconomic measures to capture a country's level of societal development. Namely, we include gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 2005 US-dollars and the annual change in a consumer price index (CPI) measured by three indicator variables: between 5 and 25%, between 25 and 100%, and >100%. The omitted reference category is a change of <5%. Theory does not provide clear guidance for the signs of coefficients on income and inflation. On the one hand, poverty and economic volatility may coincide with a shortage in contraceptive supply and worse healthcare in general, leading to high gonorrhea incidence (Jones et al., 2002) . On the other hand, if sexual activity is a normal good, wealthier societies may show higher STD rates.
17. This weighting is common in studies examining rates as the dependent variable, since a larger population is likely to generate lower sampling variance leading to heteroskedasticity that is related to population size (see, e.g., Greene, 2011) . However, a few recent sources have cautioned against using weighted least squares as a solution for heteroskedasticity (see, e.g., Wooldridge, 2008 and Pischke, 2008) . These sources suggest that White robust standard errors handle heteroskedasticity sufficiently well, without giving rise to a potential bias that accompanies weighted least squares estimation. Although we provide non-weighted estimates as a robustness check, we prefer the weighted estimates for reasons suggested below.
The vector X it also includes the percent share of the population aged 15-24. Since this is the age group with the highest likelihood of contracting gonorrhea (Lowndes and Fenton, 2004b) , we expect a positive coefficient on this variable. Furthermore, we incorporate urbanization and population density to account for the role of remoteness and agglomeration in the development of legal norms and the transmission of STDs (Dehne et al., 2002) . Finally, as from the previous work by Dee (2008) , it has been found that the right to same-sex-marriage can lead to changes in STD incidence, we also include an indicator variable that equals 1 if a country grants such rights and 0 otherwise.
Our regression controls for common period effects in reported gonorrhea incidence through ν t . The country-fixed effects λ i absorb time-invariant country characteristics like cultural and religious norms that may affect both abortion legislation and the incidence of gonorrhea. The country effect is also useful because it allows us to control for the country difference in gonorrhea surveillance systems that we discuss in the appendix. Furthermore, we include country-specific time trends to control for differential trends not captured by the year indicators and our other controls.
We identify the relationship between abortion access on reported gonorrhea incidence by the discrete changes in abortion laws in the nine countries that substantially reformed their abortion legislation in the sampled period, namely Albania, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, and Spain. The control group consists of the 32 other countries in our sample which did not change between our abortion law categories in the sampled periods. The identification strategy thus hinges on the comparability of the law-changing and non-law changing countries once we control for the covariates included in equation (2). However, since one might wonder if the countries changing their laws in this period are somehow different from the others that maintain constant abortion access for the entire 20-year period, we present most of our results restricting attention to only those law-changing countries. Our results survive this sample restriction, despite the reduction in statistical power resulting from a reduction from 41 countries to a mere nine.
Data
We obtained gonorrhea incidence data 18 Control, 1994 , and Public Health Agency of Canada, 2008 . Because there are no internationally binding guidelines for the collection of gonorrhea data, the accuracy and detail of reported incidence rates vary between countries and across time. Countries differ in their capacity to identify individuals who have contracted gonorrhea. Furthermore, even though we only consider countries which mandate physicians to report gonorrhea cases to the national surveillance agency, physician reporting rates differ across countries (See Lowndes and Fenton, 2004a , Panchaud et al., 2000 , Dehne et al., 2002 , Van Duynhoven, 1999 . We describe the variation in data collection methods and data quality in further detail in the appendix. As discussed in the previous section, the inclusion of country-fixed effects and country-specific time trends in our model enables us to control for some of these differences.
19 Also, to the extent that differential fastidiousness generates dependence within the data for a given country, using standard errors clustered at the country level accounts for such effects. We obtained the GDP per capita and CPI time-series online from the United States Department of Agriculture's Economic Research Service (United States Department of Agriculture, 2009). To obtain estimates of the total population, the share of the population aged between 15 and 24, the degree of urbanization and population density, we used the United Nation's World Population Prospect (United Nations, 2007) . Because these data are 18. For the robustness checks in Section 7, we also acquired data on syphilis, malaria, and tuberculosis.
19. Gonorrhea incidence data are missing for 28 of the 861 country-time cells in our sample, namely for Albania 1988 , 1989 , for Bulgaria 1980 -1984 , and 1986 -1987 , for Cyprus 1980 -1983 , for Germany 1990 , Ireland 1980 -1988 , for The Netherlands 1980 -1981 , and for Spain 1980 -1981 Because in no case the missing data points fall into the immediate vicinity of abortion law changes (one period before or after), and usually occur at the beginning of a country time series, we assume the data gaps to be random with respect to abortion law. The issue of missing data is addressed in further detail in Section 7. available only in five-year intervals, linear interpolation was used to fill the data gaps. Data on same-sex-marriage laws was acquired from Dee (2008) and other online sources. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables in our empirical models.
Results
Before examining our regression results, we provide Figure 1 which graphically examines the change from pre-existing trends in gonorrhea rates occurring at the time the legal changes were made in Albania, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, and Spain. In each graph, we provide an extrapolation of the pre-law trend, the actual observation, and a reference line noting when the law changed.
While graphs can be misleading, primarily because they do not condition on other changing variables, it is interesting to note that Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal, and Romania all provide at least weak patterns consistent with our hypothesis. In each of these cases, the observation (within a year or two) following the law change diverges upward from the projected trend. Canada's and Germany's pre-existing trends both suggest negative rates in the year following the law change, making it difficult to discern much of an effect. Spain appears to go in the opposite direction, though, as we note, Spain is among the group of countries with relatively poor gonorrhea surveillance in our sample. Because simple time-series trends can be misleading, we exploit the panel nature of our data. Table 3 presents the results of our econometric analysis. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 report coefficient estimates for models that measure abortion access with an indicator variable that equals 1 if abortions are available on demand or on socioeconomic or mental health grounds, and 0 if abortions are legal only to save the woman's physical health or life.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 present results for models that include two separate indicator variables for laws that permit abortions on demand and for laws that permit it on socioeconomic or mental health grounds. Columns 1 and 3 do not include covariates other than the country-and time-fixed effects and a country-specific time trend, whereas columns 2 and 4 add the full set of covariates captured in the vector X it discussed in Section 4.
Because in all four specifications our reference category are laws that allow abortion only to save the woman's life or to preserve her physical health, the reported coefficients measure the impact of increased access to abortion relative to the most restrictive legislation. Below each coefficient estimate, we report standard errors with clustering at the country level in parentheses. 20 The results presented in columns 1 and 2 suggest that changes in legislation from the most restrictive abortion laws to a law that makes abortion available on demand or on socioeconomic or mental health grounds leads to an increase of 35 cases of gonorrhea per 100,000 residents. This represents an increase of more than 60%. Column 2 shows that this result declines slightly when additional covariates are included in the model. Both 20. We also estimated specifications allowing for multi-way clustering (see Cameron, 2011) along the country and year dimensions to account both for the normal time series dependence within a country as well as cross-sectional dependence arising from sources such as changes in WHO reporting conventions, etc. Those results are qualitatively similar to the results presented here. coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. The results are in line with our expectation that easier access to abortion leads to higher reported gonorrhea incidence. Columns 3 and 4 represent results for the specifications that use separate indicators for laws that make abortion available on demand and laws make it available on socioeconomic or mental health grounds. The results are qualitatively similar to those for the single abortion indicator. Although the on demand coefficient is statistically significant at the 10 and 5% levels in the no controls and full controls specifications, respectively, in both cases, the two abortion law coefficients are jointly significant at the 1% level. The socioeconomic/mental exception law coefficient is smaller than the on demand coefficient in both cases, but it is statistically significant at the 1% level in both specifications, owing to greater precision. In neither case is the difference between the two laws' coefficients statistically significant, suggesting that the requirement to provide socioeconomic or mental health grounds to be granted access to abortion may not be rigorously enforced.
In Table 4 , we restrict attention to only those nine countries that change their law during our sample period. Although doing so reduces statistical power, it reduces the chance that unobserved heterogeneity is driving our results if the law changing countries systematically differ from the rest of the sample.
In all cases, the law coefficients increase in magnitude, and each is statistically significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, once attention is restricted to the law changing countries, the differential between the relationship between the on demand regime and regimes conditioning access on socioeconomic/mental health concerns grows. In both cases, the on demand coefficient is larger in magnitude, and the difference between the two effects is statistically significant at the 1% level. This raises the possibility that enforcement of the socioeconomic/mental health conditions is more serious in this subset of countries.
Robustness Checks
In the specifications presented in Tables 3 and 4 , we examined the level of the gonorrhea rate consistent with the earlier work of Stratmann (2003, 2008) . However, one concern may be that our results are driven by outliers. To address this concern, Table 5 presents the full control specification from the previous table, using only the law-changing countries, and compares the level results with coefficients estimated using log gonorrhea rate as the dependent variable. Interestingly, the magnitude of the relative effect increases in the log specification. While this may suggest that our main results actually understate the true relationship between abortion liberalization on gonorrhea rates, at a minimum, it mitigates concerns that outliers are driving the result.
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Another concern involves the use of a weighted least squares estimation technique. Although WLS is the normal approach to modeling rates as dependent variables, some have raised concerns. Namely, if heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are used, the usual justification for WLS, that it accounts for the lower sampling variation found in large population areas, seems to be weakened. Some (e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2008) even suggest that WLS can introduce bias into the estimates.
In some sense, the bias issue depends on interpretation. It is almost surely the case that there is heterogeneity in the relationship we estimate. Given that, the question arises about how to average over that heterogeneity. If the 21. We have also estimated the relationship using leverage robust regression techniques (e.g., Stata's rreg command). This approach also mitigates any concerns about the influence of high leverage observations since we get qualitatively similar results to those presented here. Robust standard errors with clustering at the country level are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 3 is the number of individuals per 100,000 residents who are diagnosed with gonorrhea in year t in country i. Columns 2 and 4 use the natural log of this measure. The presented coefficients show estimation results for models that use indicator variables derived from the three category abortion law categorization. All models include the control variables used in Table 3 . Regressions for columns 1 and 2 use population weights. Sample period: 1980-2000. N = 176. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01.
research question involves what a country can expect to happen, on average, when it liberalizes its abortion access laws, equal weighting is appropriate (assuming heteroskedasticity is dealt with appropriately). If, instead, the research question involves the microeconomic issue regarding how a randomly chosen representative individual's behavior is likely to change in the face of a legal change, population weighting is correct independent of its use as a solution to the heteroskedasticity problem. Failing to weight by population would put too much weight on a small country's heterogeneous effect, while putting too little on a large country's effect. Because we view this issue as primarily one of micro behavior, we prefer the WLS approach. That said, we also provide equally weighted OLS estimates in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 . We continue to estimate a statistically significant positive relationship between both law types (on demand: p = .052 in level specification, p = .012 in log specification; socioeconomic/mental: p = .097 in level specification, p = .006 in log specification).
Although the log specifications mitigate concerns about outliers, the point estimates in these specifications are problematic. While the level specifications suggest a relative relationship between moving to abortion on demand of 84 and 61% in the population weighted and equal weighted models, respectively, the log models suggest relative changes that are an order of magnitude larger. Similar effect differences are observed with respect to abortion on socioeconomic or mental health grounds. This huge difference seems to be completely driven by the inclusion of Germany, Portugal, and Spain, each of which have very poor reporting rates, averaging less than 50% of all cases. If these countries are excluded from the analysis in Table 5 , the log specifications generate effect sizes of about 50% which is comparable to our original findings in the level specifications.
Another concern arises given that some of our law-changing countries have incomplete gonorrhea data throughout the sample period. If we restrict our attention to the six law-changing countries whose data are complete in the period 1982-2000, 22 we find comparable results, as shown in Table 6 .
We are also concerned about the possibility that we are picking up some unobserved shift in health awareness. That is, perhaps underlying gonorrhea rates are not changing, but, rather, it is merely diagnoses that are increasing as people receive more health resources. To address this possibility, we examine other communicable diseases for which we have data for the law-changing countries. In principle, these diseases should not exhibit any increase in infection rates related to the law changes, but they could exhibit increasing diagnosis rates if the legal changes just happen to occur coincidentally with some increase in health awareness.
The diseases for which data are available are syphilis, malaria, and tuberculosis. As mentioned above, although syphilis is an STD, it is a disease that is primarily an issue in the male homosexual community, suggesting that it will not be affected by our proposed causal mechanism. As shown in Table 7 , we find no effect for syphilis or malaria. Interestingly, we do 22. Canada, Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal, Romania, and Spain. Data for Spain are missing for the very beginning of the sample period (1980 and 1981) , so we restrict our analysis to 1982-2000. However, if we leave Spain out and use the full time series for the other five countries, our results are qualitatively similar. Moreover, the results we obtain when also including countries with complete gonorrhea data that did not change their abortion laws during the sampled period are also qualitatively similar to those shown in Table 3 . Robust standard errors with clustering at the country level are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is the number of individuals per 100,000 who are diagnosed with gonorrhea (1; N = 176), syphilis (2, N = 157), malaria (3; N = 170), and tuberculosis (4; N = 183) in year t in country i. The presented coefficients show estimation results for models that use indicator variables derived from the three category abortion law categorization. All models include the control variables used in find a statistically significant increase in tuberculosis. Upon further examination, however, this appears to make sense. Namely, tuberculosis is often co-morbid with gonorrhea since gonorrhea weakens a person's immune system. 23 It is interesting to note that the tuberculosis effect is much smaller, absolutely and relatively, than the gonorrhea effect, suggesting it is unlikely that people are being diagnosed for gonorrhea ancillary to being treated for tuberculosis.
One last analysis we perform is an attempt to provide greater context for our results. Namely, if increasing abortion access does not affect the underlying rate of sexual activity, any additional abortions should be reflected in a comparable decline in birth rates. If, instead, increasing abortion access leads individuals to engage in more sex or be more likely to engage in sex without using a condom, on the margin, abortion rates should increase more than birth rates decline. To examine this issue, we use data from the Alan Guttmacher Institute (Henshaw et al., 1999) on cross country abortion rates during the sample period under consideration here. Unfortunately, abortion data for many countries are not available. However, high quality abortion data are available for four of our law changing countries: Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, and Hungary.
In Table 8 , we examine the change in gonorrhea rates, birth rates, and abortion rates associated with these countries' (denoted as the limited sample in the table) movement from abortion for socioeconomic/mental reasons to abortion on demand. We find that while abortion rates increase by about 7%, birth rates only decline by 2%. Gonorrhea rates increase by about 28%. These results are consistent with a model in which individuals engage in more risky sex when abortion access increases.
While it is difficult to calibrate these results precisely, they are not implausible. While some estimates place the likelihood of a woman getting pregnant in a given sexual encounter at 20%, these estimates generally assume the sex occurs at the most fertile period of the woman's cycle. This implies that the likelihood for any given sexual encounter is well below 10% (Wilcox et al., 1995) . On the other hand, credible estimates suggest that a Models estimated on expanded sample include all countries with gonorrhea reporting rates above 50% that also have abortion estimates available from Henshaw et al. (1999) . Models estimated on limited sample use data from countries changing abortion law to "on demand" abortion for which abortion estimates are available from Henshaw et al. (1999) : Bulgaria; Canada; Czech Republic; and Hungary. All models include the control variables used in Table 3 . All models use population weights. Sample period for gonorrhea and births: 1980-2000. Years covered for abortions : 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1990-1996 woman will contract gonorrhea with a probability of at least 60% in a given sexual encounter with a man infected with gonorrhea (National Institute of Health 2001). Whether or not the random abortion law-induced encounter is likely to be with someone with gonorrhea is unknowable, but, if it is, and pregnancy is less likely than gonorrhea contraction by a factor of 6, then the "missing" 5% decline in births is consistent with a 30% increase in gonorrhea incidence. While we do not place that much confidence in the precision of our point estimates, especially since the relevant data set is very small, the results in Table 8 suggest the effect sizes we find are completely plausible. Despite the plausible claim that gonorrhea may exhibit a greater response to abortion liberalization than abortion rates themselves do, as laid out above, it is reasonable to suggest that the small abortion effect we find casts doubt on our primary results. Intuitively, since abortion rates are generally higher in many countries than are gonorrhea rates, one might expect a larger effect on abortions themselves if our posited mechanism is at work. While such a claim relies on certain assumptions regarding who is the marginal individual for whom easier abortion access leads to a change in behavior (if it is someone likely to have sex with a partner infected with gonorrhea or not, as discussed above, then it is reasonable to think that any gonorrhea effect will be larger than any change in abortion rates), it is valuable to see if we can better identify the abortion relationship. To do this, we also provide results from an expanded sample, which includes all countries with available abortion data that also have gonorrhea reporting rates above 50%.
24 By including these additional countries, we can better estimate the underlying time effects common to all countries. This expanded sample generates a comparable gonorrhea effect, while liberalized abortion access appears to be associated with statistically significant increases in both the birth rate and the abortion rates. Both of these results are consistent with a story whereby increased access to abortion leads people to engage in more risky sex.
Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether decisions on sexual activity are in part driven by considerations of costs and benefits. To test this hypothesis, our empirical approach relates abortion laws of different restrictiveness to reported gonorrhea incidence which is our proxy for risky sexual behavior. In our econometric analysis, we use data from 41 countries for the 1980-2000 period, as well as a more focused analysis of the nine countries that change their abortion laws during the sample period.
Consistent with our theoretical prediction and consistent with the results of Stratmann (2003, 2008) , we find that compared with legislation that only permits abortion to save the woman's life or her physical health, less restrictive abortion policies lead to significantly higher reported gonorrhea incidence. Our results are robust against a set of alternative model specifications that include the use of different weighing schemes and subsamples. Results for non-sexually transmitted diseases suggest that our findings are likely not driven by omitted variable bias arising from factors that make diagnosis more likely.
A concern remains that the countries whose legal variation we examine are idiosyncratic in ways that make one suspicious of drawing causal inferences from these results. Namely, Portugal and Spain both have relatively poor reporting systems for gonorrhea, missing a majority of cases. For Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, and Romania, concerns that the mechanism generating the change are related to the political changes these countries experienced around the time of abortion law changes (as opposed to the laws themselves having an effect on behavior) are impossible to rule out.
However, despite these concerns, the basic result that increased abortion access is associated with an increase in risky sex has now been demonstrated in three separate samples covering different periods, countries, and types of laws. Our results suggest that human disease spread models might be improved by including a behavioral component to generate more reliable results. Further, the finding that more liberal abortion laws are associated with an increase in risky sex may help practitioners to quantify and safeguard against possible public health repercussions of abortion liberalization. number of diagnosed cases has several causes. In poorer and sparsely populated areas, the remoteness of healthcare facilities reduces diagnosis rates as people often resort to self-medication (Dehne et al., 2002) . Self medication is also more frequent in societies that stigmatize STDs. 27 Other factors are partner notification requirements in the case of a diagnosed infection and the extent of screening programs.
28
27. For Italy, Dal Conte (2001) report that while only 3303 gonorrhea cases were officially registered in 1981, 127,000 units of gonorrhea medication were sold during the same year.
28. Most countries subject only certain high-risk groups like sex workers to routine screenings. More universal screening may lead to much higher reported incidence because gonorrhea can in many cases remain asymptomatic. See Van Duynhoven (1999) .
Screening and partner notification are more comprehensive in the newly independent states and Scandinavia. In Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States partner notification is recommended but not mandatory. Belgium, France, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, do not have partner-notification policies.
